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Griffin: DNA Collection Acts and the Fourth Amendment

DNA COLLECTION ACTS AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE
REFORM IN GEORGIA TO IMPLEMENT
COLLECTION OF ARRESTEES’ DNA
M. Binford Griffin
INTRODUCTION
In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Maryland’s DNA Collection Act (the Act), 1
which permits the warrantless collection of deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) from arrestees who have not yet been convicted.2 In the King
decision, the Court was called upon to determine whether law
enforcement’s taking and analyzing an arrestee’s DNA were searches
or seizures under the Fourth Amendment.3 The Court combined the
two separate Fourth Amendment issues of collecting an arrestee’s
DNA with a buccal swab 4 and analyzing the DNA in the Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Combined DNA Index System
(“CODIS”).5 While the Court’s opinion analyzes only Maryland law,

J.D. Candidate, 2016, Georgia State University College of Law. A huge thank you to the Board
and Members of the Georgia State University Law Review for all of your time and effort spent editing;
this Note would not have been possible without your diligence. Thank you Professor Nirej Sekhon for
your guidance and critiques throughout the writing process. Last but not least, thank you Mom, Dad,
Neil, and friends for putting up with me through the writing process.
1. See generally Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., PUB.
SAFETY § 2-504 (LexisNexis 2011) (requiring collection of a DNA sample from individuals charged
with violent crimes or attempted violent crimes; as well as burglary or attempted burglary).
2. § 2-504(a)–(b).
3. See generally King, 133 S. Ct. 1958; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Strictly speaking, the Fourth
Amendment applies only to the federal government, but the Fourteenth Amendment extends the same
standards to the states. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy is applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
4. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965. A buccal swab is obtained from the arrestees by rubbing a “flocked
synthetic swab” against the parotid gland area of the mouth (cheek) for 30 seconds to collect samples of
nuclear DNA. See Materials and Methods for Specimen Collection, Storage, and Shipment, CTR. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/mumps/lab/specimen-collect.html (last
updated May 29, 2015); see also How to Collect a Buccal Swab Sample for Forensic Analysis, PURITAN
MED. PRODS. (Aug. 25, 2014, 11:24 AM), http://blog.puritanmedproducts.com/how-to-collect-a-buccalswab-sample-for-forensic-analysis.
5. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968. Combining the issues has caused much confusion in lower courts. See,
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the implications of the holding are national.6 Other state legislatures
with similar arrestee DNA collection laws must conform their
respective statutes with the specific factors enumerated in King to
remain constitutional.7
Georgia’s current DNA collection law limits collection to
convicted felons,8 but should be extended to include arrestees as a
result of the Maryland v. King holding.9 In applying a reasonableness
balancing test, the Court held in Maryland v. King that the
government’s interests in promoting safety and identifying arrested
individuals outweighed the privacy interests of the arrestee, thus
making collection of DNA from arrested individuals a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment. 10 Weighing against the
government interests, the Court evaluated the Act’s individual
privacy protections, noting that the Act limited the collection to those
arrested for violent felonies, expressly limited the scope of genetic
information that police could obtain from arrestees, and provided
procedures for automatic expungement. 11 Georgia’s current statute
regarding DNA collection does not include strict limits on these
issues, except to leave the procedures for collecting and
e.g., Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753 (Md. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1509 (2015) (holding that the
collection of DNA by scraping skin cells of a suspect who voluntarily entered the police station was
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment because the suspect had abandoned his skin cells and no
longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in regards to what the skin cells contained); see also
Elizabeth E. Joh, Maryland v. King: Policing and Genetic Privacy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 281, 282
(2013).
6. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968.
7. Id. at 1967–69. See People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), petition for
review granted, 342 P.3d 415 (Cal. 2015), for an example of a non-compliant statute deemed
unconstitutional under the state constitution.
8. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-160(b) (2012).
9. S.B. 77, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (Senate Committee Substitute) (proposing
legislation to amend O.C.G.A § 35-3-160 to include arrestee DNA in the federal database). Senate Bill
77 was introduced during the 2015 Regular Session, but did not pass out of the Senate Chamber. Id. Due
to the structure of the Georgia General Assembly, the bills still remaining at the end of the evennumbered calendar year are eligible to carry over into the next calendar year’s session. GA. CONST. art.
III, § 4, para. 1. Therefore, Senate Bill 77 will begin the 2016 legislative session as substituted by the
Senate Committee on Judiciary Non-Civil. Ga. S.B. 77.
10. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (holding that because the “valid arrest supported by probable cause,”
which diminished the arrestee’s reasonable expectation of privacy, was outweighed by the state’s
interest in identifying the individual through the use of a “routine booking procedure,” collecting the
arrestee’s DNA was considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
11. Id. at 1967.
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disseminating the genetic information to the judgment of the Division
of Forensic Sciences of the Georgia Bureau of Investigations.12 Out
of the important factors to the Court, Georgia’s proposed legislation
only addresses the types of serious offenses that would trigger DNA
collection upon arrest. 13 Contrasting Maryland’s statute, Georgia’s
proposed statute allows DNA collection from individuals arrested for
“serious offenses,”14 does not prohibit familial searches, and requires
action by the arrestee to expunge his DNA profile, which the
Supreme Court could deem too broad and unspecific.15 Federal law
limits CODIS database access to states that carefully control privacy
issues in DNA collection protocol;16 so without further restrictions,
Georgia’s lenient regulations could cause the federal government to
deny Georgia continued CODIS privileges.
This Note compares Maryland’s DNA Collection Act to Georgia’s
statutory equivalent, focusing on the factors established in Maryland
v. King. Part I describes what DNA is and how law enforcement uses
DNA information.17 It further details how DNA collection fits into
current Fourth Amendment law and its exceptions as well as the
problems with Georgia’s DNA collection statute based on the King
decision.18 Part II compares the decision in King and the foundational
Act behind it with leading cases on DNA from Georgia and
Georgia’s proposed DNA Collection Act. 19 Part II also discusses,

12. § 35-3-160(c) (“The analysis shall be performed by the division.”); see also GA. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION - DIV. OF FORENSIC SCIS., DNA OPERATIONS MANUAL (2013), https://gbidofs.com/QualitySystem/documentbrowser.aspx (follow “Official Manuals” folder in left pane; then
follow “Operations” folder; then follow “DNA” folder; then follow “DNA OPERATIONS” hyperlink);
GA. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION - DIV. OF FORENSIC SCIS., CODIS OPERATIONS MANUAL (2014),
https://gbi-dofs.com/QualitySystem/documentbrowser.aspx (follow “Office Manuals” folder in left
pane; then “Operations” folder; then “CODIS” folder).
13. Ga. S.B. 77.
14. Id.
15. Compare § 35-3-160(b), and Ga. S.B. 77 (allowing collection from individuals arrested for a
“serious offense”), with MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (LexisNexis 2011) (providing that DNA
may be collected from individuals charged with violent crimes upon a finding of probable cause).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(c) (2012). “Failure to comply. Access to the index established by this section
is subject to cancellation if the quality control and privacy requirements described in subsection
(b) . . . are not met.” Id.
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. See infra Part I.B–C.
19. See infra Part II.
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through exposure of the shortcomings of Georgia’s proposed DNA
collection Act, why reform is necessary. 20 Part III proposes a
commission to regulate Georgia’s DNA collection laws as well as
specific changes that must be made to Georgia’s proposed DNA
collection Act before it is passed.21
I. DNA COLLECTION AND THE LAW
A. DNA: What Is It And How Does Law Enforcement Use It?
DNA is genetic material used to identify individuals based on the
specific genome sequences contained within each cell of the body.22
The type of DNA typically used to identify an individual is contained
in samples of body fluids, skin cells, bones, or hair follicles.23 Within
the DNA molecule, the genetic locations used only for identification
purposes are referred to as the CODIS 13 or the CODIS Core Loci.24
DNA technology has been very useful to law enforcement through
its “unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and
to identify the guilty.” 25 DNA technology “has the potential to
significantly improve both the criminal justice system and police
investigative practices.”26 DNA has become a powerful tool for law
enforcement through the implementation and use of DNA databases
nationwide. 27 In response to congressional passage of the DNA
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA), NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/
25520880 (last updated June 16, 2015).
23. DNA Casework Unit (DCU), FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/biometric-analysis/dna-casework-unit-dcu-1 (last visited Jan. 13, 2016) (“Nuclear DNA
(nDNA) . . . is typically analyzed in evidence containing body fluids, skin cells, bones, and hairs that
have tissue at their root ends. The power of nDNA testing lies in the ability to identify an individual as
being the source of the DNA . . . .”).
24. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index
System, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codisand-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Jan. 13, 2016) [hereinafter FBI FAQs on CODIS and DNA].
25. Dist. Att’y’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 (2009).
26. Id.
27. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USING DNA TO SOLVE COLD CASES 9
(2002), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/194197.pdf (describing a “success story” where a Florida
man who died in a drug deal was connected to seven unsolved rape cases in Washington, D.C. by
including his DNA profile in the national forensic index); see also Rapid DNA Act 2015: Hearing on
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Identification Act of 1994,28 the FBI created a national system for
maintaining and storing DNA profiles of certain individuals in
collaboration with state and local laboratories. 29 The DNA
Identification Act of 1994 established requirements for federal, state,
and local law enforcement participation in the national program,
including limiting the classes of individuals from whom DNA is
collected, 30 laboratory qualifications and standards, 31 procedures to
expunge samples, 32 and limiting collection to “DNA identification
records.” 33 Because of the strict compliance requirements of the
national database, some states and localities have created their own—
largely unregulated—”offline” DNA databases with samples taken
from anyone and everyone encountering law enforcement, including
crime victims and witnesses.34
Scholars disagree on the potential impact of implementing a
national DNA database35 and many arguments focus on the negative
H.R. 320 Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 14 (2015) (prepared statement of Amy S. Hess, Executive
Assistant Director, Science and Technology Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (describing the
importance of an “expanded scope of collection, the commitment to analyze sexual assault evidence kits
and the use of a John Doe indictment” to allow prosecution of a 20-year old sexual assault which was
accomplished through the collection of arrestee DNA and the CODIS database).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2012) (allowing the development of a National DNA Index System).
29. See FBI FAQs on CODIS and DNA, supra note 24.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (allowing the FBI to establish an index of: DNA samples from crime
scenes, DNA samples recovered from unidentified human remains, DNA samples voluntarily
contributed from family members of missing persons, and “DNA identification records of: persons
convicted of crimes; persons who have been charged in an indictment or information with a crime; and
other persons whose DNA samples are collected under applicable legal authorities” as long as that
individual provided the sample to be excluded as a suspect).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(2) (stating that the CODIS database shall only include information on
DNA profiles that are prepared in laboratories that are accredited by a “nonprofit professional
association of persons actively involved in forensic science that is nationally recognized within the
forensic science community; and” that “undergo external audits” every two years that ensure
compliance with the standards determined by the FBI Director).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d) (stating that the director of the FBI and the State are responsible for
expunging DNA profiles of individuals convicted of a federal offense or a local offense, respectively,
whose conviction has been overturned or has been dismissed prior to trial).
33. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 14132; FBI FAQs on CODIS and DNA, supra note 24.
34. Joh, Policing and Genetic Privacy, supra note 5, at 286; see also Joseph Goldstein, Police
Agencies Are Assembling Records of DNA, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/13/us/police-agencies-are-assembling-records-of-dna.html?smid=pl-share.
35. See generally Andrea Roth, Maryland v. King and the Wonderful, Horrible DNA Revolution in
Law Enforcement, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 295 (2013); see also David H. Kaye, Maryland v. King: Per
Se Unreasonableness, the Golden Rule, and the Future of DNA Databases, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 39, 47
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effects of expanding the databases to include arrestees. 36 Yet the
most troublesome aspect of DNA collection laws is the growing
number of unregulated databanks, which will continue to increase
unless and until legally restricted.37
B. The Fourth Amendment, Reasonableness Balancing, And DNA
Collection
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures by imposing a requirement for probable cause
to issue a warrant.38 Over time, the rules requiring probable cause
and warrants have amalgamated with a “form of reasonableness
balancing” to determine whether a search was justified under the
Fourth Amendment. 39 To discern what is reasonable, the Court
(2013); Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, The Expanding Use of DNA in Law Enforcement:
What Role for Privacy?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 153, 154 (2006); Rana Santos, Why DNA Databasing is
Good for Maryland: A DNA Analyst’s Perspective, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 591, 608 (2013) (“From a
purely scientific point of view, more data is better.”)..
36. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Make no mistake about
it: As an entirely predictable consequence of today’s decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into
a national DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason.”); Joh,
supra note 5, Policing and Genetic Privacy, at 285 (claiming that the expansion to arrestees gives police
an incentive to make more arrests); see also Kelly Ferrell, Comment, Twenty-First Century
Surveillance: DNA “Data-Mining” and the Erosion of the Fourth Amendment, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 229,
243 (2013) (arguing that the federal statute is the most expansive in including all arrestees, causing
problems when the states individually impose more specific restrictions); Carlos Jordi, Comment,
Diminished Returns: The Exorbitance of Collecting DNA From All Arrestees, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
346, 348 (2014) (seeking to “examine the effects of a criminal justice system where DNA is collected
from everyone who is arrested, regardless of the seriousness of the charge”); Brian Clark Stuart,
Comment, Dethroning King: Why the Warrantless DNA Testing of Arrestees Should Be Prohibited
Under State Constitutions, 83 MISS. L.J. 1111, 1132–56 (2014).
37. See Ferrell, supra note 36, at 233; see also SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC
JUSTICE: DNA DATA BANKS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 29–30, 36 (2011)
(suggesting stricter federal regulations since, historically, the states have followed the federal
government’s lead in DNA database regulations as a means “toward forensic DNA harmonization”);
Elizabeth E. Joh, Artificial Intelligence and the Law: Essay: Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the
Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 67–68 (2014) (concluding that the use of “big data” is likely
to become a normal part of police procedures, so courts and legislatures should plan to impose limits on
its use).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause . . . . ”); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 395 (1974); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History;
Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1721–22 (1996).
39. Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment, 68 U.
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balances the interests of the government against the privacy interests
of the individual and degree of the search’s intrusiveness. 40 The
Court measures an individual’s privacy interests through the relevant
facts and circumstances of the situation to establish whether that
individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the target of the
search.41 If the government interest outweighs the individual interest,
the Supreme Court considers the search reasonable.42
Despite the presumption that “reasonableness generally requires a
warrant,” the Supreme Court has excused warrantless searches under
certain circumstances.43 In some circumstances, the Court has simply
relaxed the need for a warrant based on reduced expectations of
privacy.44 “Special needs” searches are also considered an exception
to the warrant requirement.45 The Court has used the special needs

MIAMI L. REV. 589, 602 (2014). See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 346 (1985) (upholding
the search of a student’s purse in a public school based on reasonable suspicion and lacking probable
cause); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (serving as the foundation of “reasonableness” searches);
Camera v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 538–40 (1967) (upholding the constitutionality of a
warrantless house inspection not based on individualized suspicion).
40. Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 271–73
(2011) (noting that special subpopulation searches have typically been conducted in order to “further
important government interests independent of law enforcement”).
41. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (reasoning that there is a “twofold requirement,
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). See also Steven D. Schwinn,
Does the Fourth Amendment Allow a State to Collect and Analyze DNA from People Arrested for, but
Not Convicted of, Serious Crimes?, 40 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 214, 215 (2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/public_education/MarylandvKing_ABA_Preview5
_021913.authcheckdam.pdf.
42. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1977–78 (2013).
43. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Schwinn, supra note 41, at 215;
see also, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633–35 (1989); Nat’l Treasury Emps.
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 678–679 (1989).
44. See Schwinn, supra note 41, at 215; see also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 853 (2006)
(holding that a parolee had a lower expectation of privacy than a probationer would have); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984) (holding that a prisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy
inside his jail cell).
45. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668 (“[I]n certain limited circumstances, the Government’s need to
discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to
justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of
individualized suspicion.”); see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. “Therefore, in the context of safety and
administrative regulations, a search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable ‘when “special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable.”‘” Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
829 (2002) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
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exception to uphold suspicionless drug testing of railway workers,46
high school students involved in extracurricular activities, 47 and
Treasury employees; 48 but government interests were not strong
enough to apply the exception to political candidates.49 The Court has
also upheld searches of public school students and their belongings,
which lacked individualized suspicion,50 illegal immigrants crossing
at border checkpoints,51 and vehicles stopped during roadblocks to
discover drunk driving 52 —but not to uncover drugs because the
primary purpose of the search was to discover criminal activity. 53
With the King decision, “reasonableness” has moved to the forefront
of the special needs exception’s application to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.54
The Supreme Court applied this “reasonableness balancing” in
Maryland v. King by comparing the government’s need to properly
identify arrestees, with the arrestee’s right to privacy in light of the
minimally invasive nature of the buccal swab. 55 The Court
determined that the legitimate government interest to protect was
“the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to
process and identify the persons and possessions they must take into
custody.”56 The Court weighed this government interest against the
46. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
47. Earls, 536 U.S. at 829–30 (applying the special needs exception to all high school students
wishing to participate in extracurricular activities); Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657
(1995) (applying the special needs exception to searches of high school athletes).
48. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679.
49. See generally Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
50. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–43 (1985).
51. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976).
52. See generally Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Stiz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
53. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000).
54. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013) (stating that the special needs precedent cases
did not have a bearing on the issues presented in this case, yet formulating the outcome in the same
manner that special needs cases are analyzed—by balancing government interests against personal
interests to determine reasonableness). See also Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA
Testing and the Divided Court, 127 HARV. L. REV. 161, 183 (2013).
55. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1977 (In order to justify a warrantless, suspicionless search, “[t]he
government interest must outweigh the degree to which the search invades an individual’s legitimate
expectations of privacy.”).
56. Id. at 1970–75 (qualifying the government interests on five grounds: (1) the individual was
lawfully arrested based on probable cause and it could be considered a routine booking procedure used
to identify the individual properly, which is an important aspect of all criminal cases because; (2) law
enforcement has the responsibility of keeping the jail safe and knowing criminal history to a certainty
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arrestee’s reduced expectation of privacy due to his relationship with
the state, leading the Court to conclude that both taking and
analyzing King’s DNA were reasonable.57
The Supreme Court held the Maryland DNA Collection Act
constitutional because it authorizes DNA collection from individuals
arrested for violent crimes 58 and the DNA is not entered into the
CODIS database until after arraignment.59 Further, DNA samples are
destroyed if the individual is never convicted or is pardoned,60 and
there are limits on the type of genetic information included in a DNA
profile61 and how it may be used.62 The Maryland v. King factors are
may help prevent risks; (3) the State has a substantial interest in ensuring the correct individual accused
will be present for trial; (4) knowing the identity concretely may help determine whether the offender
may be released on bail, without fear he or she will pose a threat to the community; and (5) the
possibility that the DNA of an arrestee links to the perpetrator could free an innocent person being held
for the crime).
57. Id. at 1977–80 (holding the search reasonable because King was arrested on probable cause,
reducing his expectation of privacy, and the DNA collection procedure was minimally intrusive—
without threat to King’s safety or privacy).
58. Id. at 1967; MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a) (LexisNexis 2011).
59. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967; § 2-504(d)(1).
60. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967; §§ 2-504(d)(2)(i),; § 2-511(a)(1). Many states have a similar
requirement: COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-23-104(b) (2013) (Colorado: expunging the DNA sample and
profile without confirmation of a felony charge within one year of receiving the sample); MD. CODE
ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(a) (LexisNexis 2011) (Maryland: making expungement automatic if the
person is not convicted); MO. REV. STAT. § 650.055(10)–(11) (2013) (Missouri: automatically
expunging the DNA sample and profile if the prosecutor declines to prosecute, if the charges are
dropped or dismissed, there was no probable cause to support the arrest, or the arrestee is acquitted);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-266.3A(h)(1) (West 2013) (North Carolina: making the prosecutor
responsible for handling expungement if the charge is dismissed, the person is acquitted, the person is
convicted of a misdemeanor not included in list of charges for which DNA may be collected, the statute
of limitations arrives with no charge, or if the individual is not convicted within three years of the
sample being taken); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-600(A) (2009) (South Carolina: making the prosecutor
responsible for expunging the DNA sample and profile if the charges are dropped, dismissed, reduced to
a charge not listed in statute, or if the person is acquitted); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321(e)(2) (2013)
(Tennessee: making the clerk of court responsible for alerting the state laboratory of the final disposition
of the criminal charge and instructing the laboratory to destroy the DNA sample and profile if the
individual is acquitted or the charge was dismissed); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.1471(e) (West
2012) (Texas: making the court responsible for ordering the state to destroy the sample if the individual
is acquitted or the case is dismissed); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-10-406(1)(i) (LexisNexis 2010) (Utah:
expunging the DNA sample and profile if criminal charges are not filed within ninety days of booking);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1940(b) (2011) (Vermont: making the court responsible for instructing the
state to destroy the DNA sample and profile if the charge is dismissed or downgraded to a misdemeanor
under a plea agreement, the person is acquitted, or if the person is convicted of a lesser offense than one
that requires collection).
61. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967; MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2011)
(“Only DNA records that directly relate to the identification of individuals shall be collected and
stored.”); § 2-512(c) (“A person may not willfully test a DNA sample for information that does not
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foundational requirements for a state DNA collection statute to be
constitutional and Georgia’s proposed statute does not include these
factors.63
C. Problems With Georgia’s Current Statute
Georgia’s DNA collection statute begins in O.C.G.A. § 35-3-160,
which allows DNA collection from convicted felons.64 In February
2013 and again in February 2015, members of the Georgia Senate
proposed a bill to expand the statute to include arrestees, but despite
the King decision, the Georgia legislature has not yet passed a bill on
the topic.65 Georgia’s current proposed bill allows DNA collection
from individuals arrested for “serious offenses,” does not include
explicit limits on what genetic information may be extracted from
analysis of that DNA, does not limit familial searches, does not
require an arraignment hearing prior to collection, and does not
provide procedures for automatic expungement.66 The factors absent
from Georgia’s bill were important to the Supreme Court in
relate to the identification of individuals . . . . ”).
62. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967; § 2-506(d) (“A person may not perform a search of the statewide DNA
data base for the purpose of identification of an offender in connection with a crime for which the
offender may be a biological relative of the individual from whom the DNA sample was acquired.”).
63. See generally People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (holding the California
DNA collection statute unconstitutional under the more restrictive state constitution because the statute
has no limit on familial searches, allows retention of the physical sample, and allows creation of arrestee
DNA profiles prior to arraignment), petition for review granted, 342 P.3d 415 (2015); State v. Medina,
102 A.3d 661 (Vt. 2014) (holding the Vermont DNA collection statute unconstitutional under the state’s
constitution, because the state’s constitution has a more stringent warrant requirement than the U.S.
Constitution, despite the statute limiting the use of DNA to identification and prohibiting use for genetic
or medical testing, including automatic expungement procedures, and requiring arraignment before
collection); S.B. 77, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015).
64. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-160(b) (2012) (“Any person convicted of a felony offense . . . shall . . . have a
sample of his or her blood, an oral swab, or a sample obtained from a noninvasive procedure taken for
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis to determine identification characteristics specific to the
person.”).
65. Ga. S.B. 77 (Senate Bill 77 was read on the Senate floor on February 3, 2015, and referred to the
Senate Judiciary Non-Civil Committee. The Committee favorably reported the bill by substitute on
March 5, 2015, and it was read for a second time on the Senate floor on March 9, 2015. At the end of
the 2015 Regular Session, the bill remained in the Senate to be debated during the 2016 Regular
Session.); S.B. 135, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013) (Passed the Georgia Senate on February,
26 2013 to the Georgia House of Representatives, then read for a second time in the House on February
28, 2013.).
66. See generally Ga. S.B. 77.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss2/5

10

Griffin: DNA Collection Acts and the Fourth Amendment

2016]

DNA COLLECTION ACTS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

523

Maryland v. King,67 so, Georgia Senate Bill 77, as currently written,
may not pass constitutional muster.
II. THE LAW OF IMPLEMENTING ARRESTEE DNA COLLECTION IN
GEORGIA
The constitutional grounds upon which criminal defendants have
challenged state DNA collection statutes are important considerations
for shaping the ideal Georgia statute, so that the legislature may
avoid its future abolition. 68 Implementing the proper legislative
restrictions for DNA collection will allow expanded and continued
use of this important law enforcement tool and will simultaneously
protect the rights of arrestees.69
A. Applying “Reasonableness Balancing” To DNA Collection Acts
When police collect DNA from individuals, two Fourth
Amendment searches are involved, and each must survive
constitutional scrutiny. 70 It is undisputed that the act of collecting
buccal swabs from inside the arrestee’s cheek is a Fourth
Amendment “search,” 71 but this search is considered reasonable
when police make the initial arrest based on probable cause.72 The
second search occurs when police analyze the DNA to create an
individual profile, which is entered into the CODIS database for
67. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967.
68. Id.; Alex Sugzda, Note, You’re Under Arrest—Say Ah: Suggestions for Legislatures Drafting
Statutes Allowing DNA Extraction from Arrestees, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1443, 1459–60 (2013).
69. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968 (maintaining that, although the Court was specifically addressing
the Maryland statute, many states have similar statutes which the result of the decision will affect); see
also Sugzda, supra note 68, at 1459–60.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches . . . shall not be violated . . . .”); King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968–69.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968–69; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
770 (1966) (holding that any “intrusio[n] into the human body” is subject to constitutional scrutiny); see
also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968) (reasoning that whenever “cherished personal security” is
interfered with without a warrant based on probable cause, there should be a constitutional analysis to
determine if the search was reasonable).
72. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (holding a search incident to arrest reasonable when
the search is of the arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control, no matter the reason
underlying the search).
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comparison with other DNA profiles.73 For the second search to be
constitutional without police first having a search warrant, the
legitimate interests of the government must outweigh the interests of
the arrestees’ right to individual privacy.74
1. A Well-Established Governmental Interest: The Benefits of
Collecting Arrestee DNA
The governmental interests the Court cited in Maryland v. King are
useful as a guideline to all state legislatures in creating and
implementing arrestee DNA collection statutes. 75 Implementing
DNA collection and testing before pre-trial determinations are made
can reduce the chance that an offender will be released to commit
another crime, even for a short time. 76 The Court focused on the
importance of DNA analysis technology for law enforcement to
ensure safety by accurately processing and identifying the individuals
they take into custody.77
DNA is an identifying factor for an individual that cannot be
altered; therefore, it is the most reliable form of identification. 78
Knowing the proper identity of an individual can help ensure the
safety of law enforcement officers, other inmates, and the public
community. 79 However, using DNA as an identification factor
73. United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 243–44 (4th Cir. 2012) (determining that searching the
defendant’s DNA profile in the database was a separate search under the Fourth Amendment); Haskell
v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2012) (determining that searching defendant’s DNA profile
through the database is a reasonable Fourth Amendment search because of its substantial similarity to
fingerprinting analysis); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 407 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(determining that since the government interest in the Pennsylvania arrestee DNA collection Act was so
acute that it outweighed the personal privacy invasion).
74. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970; Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633–35 (1989); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
678–679 (1989).
75. See generally Sugzda, supra note 68.
76. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1973.
77. Id. at 1970.
78. Id. at 1972 (“The DNA collected from arrestees is an irrefutable identification of the person from
whom it was taken.”). See also Kimberly N. Brown, Anonymity, Faceprints, and the Constitution, 21
GEO. MASON L. REV. 409, 433 (2014) (describing that, while facial recognition technology is a
significant technological advancement, there is still “significant potential for errors and abuse” since an
individual may alter facial measurements).
79. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1972; Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004) (asserting
that knowing the true identity of an individual can help determine propensities for aggression while
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presents a paradox:80 the identification of arrestees is necessary at an
early stage, but it takes significant time to perform DNA analysis
tests. 81 Additionally, it would be improper to enter a DNA profile
into a DNA database before a neutral magistrate has established
probable cause for the charge on which the individual was arrested,
but the identity of the arrestee is important at the probable cause
hearing.82 In Maryland v. King, the Court dismissed the dissenting
Justices’ argument that extensive DNA processing time negates the
purpose of identification by establishing that the importance of
identification goes beyond “ensuring that the proper name is typed on
the indictment,”83 and that the time it takes to process DNA “goes
only to the efficacy of the search for its purpose of prompt
identification, not the constitutionality of the search.”84
While officer safety and clerical accuracy are important, proper
identification of arrestees is also critical for public policy interests.85
DNA collection from arrestees helps police apprehend individuals
released on bail for other violent felonies before they commit
additional crimes.86 Law enforcement having accurate DNA profiles

incarcerated based on prior arrests or convictions and can keep the public safe when judicial officers are
asked to make a bail determination).
80. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1984 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. DNA Casework Unit (DCU) Case Acceptance, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/dna-casework-unit-dcu (last visited Jan. 21, 2016)
(last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (stating that the average processing rate is at least thirty days). But see Rapid
DNA or Rapid DNA Analysis, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/rapid-dna-analysis (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (describing how the
federal government has planned to develop and integrate a form of rapid DNA analysis technology to
return information to local law enforcement in between one and two hours).
82. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967 (justifying the length in timeline through the text of the Maryland
statute, § 2-504(d)(1) that allows collection at the time of arrest, but the DNA profile is expunged if no
probable cause is found during the probable cause hearing).
83. Id. at 1971.
84. Id. at 1976.
85. See id. at 1972.
86. Id. at 1973–74; BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE
DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 245 (2000); see also
Denver’s
Study
on
Preventable
Crimes,
DENVER
DISTRICT
ATT’Y,
http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Denver’s%20Preventable%20Crimes%20Study.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 20, 2015); Chicago’s Study on Preventable Crimes, CITY OF CHI. (2005),
http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/ChicagoPreventableCrimes-Final.pdf; Maryland Study on
Preventable Crimes, DENVER DISTRICT ATT’Y, http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Arrestee_
Database/MarylandDNAarresteestudy.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2016).
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for additional individuals increases the probability that the correct
individual is incarcerated for a crime and may exonerate a wrongly
convicted individual. 87 These public policy issues establish the
proper foundation for the creation of a legitimate government interest
in extending DNA collection to arrestees.88
2. Arrestees Have a Lower Expectation of Privacy than Free
Citizens
Based on an arrestee’s reduced expectation of privacy, the
Supreme Court determined that the government’s interests
undoubtedly outweighed the individual privacy rights, making the
search reasonable within the limits of the Fourth Amendment.89 The
Court reasoned that a cheek swab is minimally intrusive and that the
restrictions Maryland placed on the type of extractable genetic
information from DNA protected the privacy interests of the
arrestee.90
A cheek swab causes an insignificant bodily invasion that does not
endanger the physical health of the individual from whom it is
taken. 91 Cheek swabs are less intrusive than drawing blood 92 and
other procedures in the administrative processes of booking arrested
individuals that have also fallen under similar analyses.93
87. The
Cases:
DNA
Exoneree
Profiles,
THE
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/front-page#c10=published&b_start=0&c4=
Exonerated+by+DNA (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (explaining that 337 individuals have been exonerated
based on DNA evidence and that almost fifty percent of exonerations have led to identifying the correct
perpetrator of the crime).
88. See generally King, 133 S. Ct. 1958.
89. Id. at 1980.
90. Id. at 1977–79.
91. Id. at 1979; see also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985) (determining that a critical factor
in determining the magnitude of the intrusion is the “extent to which the procedure may threaten the
safety or health of the individual”).
92. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1969; see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (upholding
the constitutionality of drawing blood during jail booking procedures). But see Winston, 470 U.S. at 760
(holding that compelling a surgical intrusion into the arrestee’s muscle to remove a bullet was too much
of a personal privacy intrusion to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
93. Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 54, 57–58 (1991) (determining that it is well
settled that probable cause to arrest both permits police to take an individual into physical custody and
to obtain his identifying information); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989)
(stating in dicta that even a breath test requires a Fourth Amendment analysis because the deep breath
needed to provide accurate readings); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558–59 (1979) (upholding the
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The Court distinguished the search of an arrestee from the search
of a free citizen by illustrating that when an individual is processed
after arrest, the booking procedures “involve a relatively extensive
exploration.” 94 These procedures sometimes involve the arrestees
“lift[ing] their genitals or cough[ing] in a squatted position,”95 which
is inherently more intense invasions of privacy than a mere cotton
swab against the inner-cheek wall.96 The invasive procedures are not
designed specifically to demean the arrestee or harm individual
dignity; they are performed for the safety of law enforcement
personnel to prevent arrestees’ smuggling contraband into the jail.97
Thus, the safety interests of the community outweigh the individual
privacy interferences imposed in these procedures.98 Determining the
proper identity of an individual using DNA analysis is equally
important to protecting the safety interests of the community, both
inside and out of the correctional facility.99
The Supreme Court has previously held that minor bodily
intrusions are reasonable to determine identifying characteristics of
arrestees. 100 The thirteen CODIS loci do not reveal any genetic
information to police besides identification characteristics. 101 With
the statutory protection limiting analysis to identifying information,
the remaining problem is law enforcement’s ability to keep an
individual’s physical DNA sample indefinitely with no requirement
constitutionality of body-cavity searches for pre-trial detainees); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295
(1973) (upholding the scraping of an individual’s fingernails to obtain trace evidence); United States v.
Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932) (upholding the constitutionality of fingerprinting arrestees).
94. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
95. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (2012).
96. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1978.
97. Id. at 1978–79.
98. Id. But cf. Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and The Unrecognized
Point of a “Pointless Indignity”, 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1010 (2014) (arguing that, instead of advocating
for personal privacy protections, the Court should focus on whether the individual’s dignity has been
infringed upon).
99. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979.
100. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (holding that an individual’s voice is an
identifying characteristic that is outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment); United States v.
Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 20 (1973) (holding that handwriting may also be considered an identifying
characteristic); United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1932) (upholding the constitutionality of
fingerprinting); see also Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58 (1991) (fingerprinting);
Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (fingerprinting);.
101. See FBI FAQs on CODIS and DNA, supra note 24.
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to destroy the sample. 102 Note that destroying the physical DNA
sample is different from expunging the DNA profile. 103 With a
statutory requirement to destroy physical DNA samples, convicted
individuals could have their DNA sample expunged, yet their DNA
profile containing only identifying information would remain in the
DNA database, protecting individuals from future privacy
intrusions.104
Many states have adopted statutory schemes requiring DNA
collection from arrestees.105 Most states with such DNA collection
statutes list the specific crimes that trigger law enforcement’s ability
to collect DNA. 106 Most statutes also mention expungement of the
DNA sample. 107 Following precedent from the Maryland v. King
decision and from other state legislatures, Georgia can craft a similar
statute that will be reasonable under both the State and Federal
Constitution.
B. “Georgia On My Mind”
The Georgia Supreme Court has indirectly acknowledged that
collecting and analyzing DNA consists of two separate Fourth
Amendment searches.108 With this acknowledgement, Georgia courts
have used a reasonableness balancing test to determine that DNA

102. Kaye, supra note 35, at 47 (proposing a universal database of DNA profiles that does not allow
the retention of the physical sample); see also Ferrell, supra note 36, at 257–58 (determining that
whether or not an individual’s charges are dropped, the state may retain their DNA sample indefinitely).
103. Compare Ferrell, supra note 36, at 258, with Sugzda, supra note 68, at 1468–69 (describing
when there are procedures in place to remove DNA profiles from databases after a charge has been
dropped, it undermines the argument that DNA collection is for identification purposes only).
104. Destroying the physical DNA sample would help prevent its further testing by law enforcement
once technology advances, should the law fail to keep pace with evolving technology. People v. Buza,
180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), petition for review granted, 342 P.3d 415 (Cal. 2015).
105. See Stuart, supra note 36, at 1158–77 (listing the twenty-nine states that have implemented
statutory schemes to allow DNA collection from arrestees).
106. See id. But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 296(a)(2)(C) (West 2004) (stating that “any adult person
arrested or charged with any felony offense” must provide a DNA sample). The statute was later held
unconstitutional under the California State constitution. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 795–96.
107. Stuart, supra note 36, at 1158–77.
108. Pace v. State, 524 S.E.2d 490, 498 (Ga. 1999) (stating it would be unreasonable for law
enforcement to obtain separate consent or a separate search warrant every time a properly obtained
DNA profile is used for comparison in another investigation).
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collection and analysis from convicted felons is proper.109 Georgia’s
legislature has already recognized the importance of including
arrestee DNA profiles in DNA databases by drafting bills during two
different legislative sessions to implement the process into law
enforcement booking procedures. 110 The most recent bill has
enumerated the “serious offenses” that can trigger DNA collection
upon arrest, but it has not rectified all of the problems with the
law. 111 If passed as written, the proposed bill could be overruled
based on the application of a reasonableness balancing test.112
1. Georgia’s Legitimate Interest in Arrestee DNA Collection
Violence in Georgia correctional facilities has risen in the past
decade.113 Georgia is among the five states with the highest number
of prison and jail inmate deaths. 114 When an offender receives a
prison sentence, he is sent to the Georgia Diagnostic and
Classification State Prison to be screened and classified according to
his threat level, but these procedures are not currently in place for
individuals arrested and remaining in jail. 115 The significant state

109. See, e.g., Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1342–44 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (noting that the
search of a prisoner need not fall within the Fourth Amendment’s “special needs” exception, so long as
the search is still reasonable in that the government interests outweigh the personal privacy interests of
the inmates, whose expectation of privacy is reduced as a result of incarceration), aff’d sub nom. Padgett
v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005).
110. S.B. 77, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (Senate Committee Substitute); S.B. 135,
152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013).
111. Ga. S.B. 77.
112. Compare Ga. S.B. 77, with MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (LexisNexis 2011). See, e.g.,
People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), petition for review granted, 342 P.3d
415 (Cal. 2015).
113. Tyler Jett, After 34 Inmate Deaths, Group Seeks Probe of Ga. Prisons, CORRECTIONSONE.COM
(July 4, 2014), http://www.correctionsone.com/corrections/articles/7348722-After-34-inmate-deathsgroup-seeks-probe-of-Ga-prisons (citing Bureau of Justice statistics that “[s]ince 2010, Georgia inmates
have killed 33 fellow prisoners and one officer”); see generally OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 247448, MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS AND STATE PRISONS, 2000–2012 –
STATISTICAL TABLES (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mljsp0012st.pdf.
114. Joy Lukachick Smith, Georgia Prison Violence Rises, TIMESFREEPRESS.COM (Apr. 14, 2013),
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2013/apr/14/georgia-prison-violence-rises/.
115. See generally Male Diagnostics & Classification, GA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS,
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/Research/Fact_Sheets/Info_Sheets_MaleDC.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
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interest in reducing inmate violence adds to the government interest
posited to outweigh personal privacy interests of arrestees.116
DNA provides an extraordinary ability for the criminal justice
system to function properly in its ability to pinpoint precisely the
individual who committed a crime.117 Georgia is among many states
with an Innocence Project. 118 These organizations seek to reverse
convictions where DNA evidence was collected at the crime scene
but DNA analysis was either not used in the course of investigation
or the technology was not available at that time. 119 The Georgia
Innocence Project is responsible for exonerating seven individuals
based on DNA evidence, who served an average of seventeen years
for crimes they did not commit.120 With an expanded base of DNA
profiles to test against, the Georgia Innocence Project can better
solidify convictions of the proper individuals and the entire criminal
justice system will function more smoothly, minimizing the
frequency of wrongful convictions.121
2. Georgia Arrestees Have a Previously Stipulated Reduced
Expectation of Privacy
The Constitution’s presumption of innocence underscores the legal
difference between arrestees and convicted felons. 122 Georgia has
116. Cf. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (stating that “the need for law enforcement
officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the persons and possessions they must take
into custody” obviously serves a legitimate government interest).
117. Stories: The FBI and DNA, Part 1, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION (Nov. 23, 2011),
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/november/dna_112311; see also Brandon L. Garrett, Judging
Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 63 n.28 (2008) (explaining that the probability of another person
matching a DNA profile may be more than one in one trillion, which is more than all of the humans that
have ever lived).
118. See
Innocence
Network
Member
Organizations,
INNOCENCE
NETWORK,
http://www.innocencenetwork.org/members (last visited Jan. 20, 2016) (listing 60 state and international
members of the Innocence Network, including Georgia).
119. See THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
120. Exonerees, GA. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.georgiainnocenceproject.org/exonerees/ (last
visited Jan. 20, 2016).
121. Jordi, supra note 36, at 367 (describing how deterrence theories support the idea that
comprehensive DNA databanks would reduce crime, but noting that there is minimal research on the
actual effect of including arrestees in the DNA databanks).
122. Murphy, supra note 54, at 175; see also Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)
(establishing the presumption of innocence as a fundamental right of a criminal defendant).
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acknowledged that while pre-trial detainees and arrestees have more
rights to privacy than convicted individuals, that right is substantially
diminished once they have been lawfully arrested. 123 The Georgia
Supreme Court determined that so long as the search of an arrestee is
not conducted solely for the purpose of uncovering additional crime,
the search is reasonable when there is a legitimate security or
maintenance purpose. 124 The search of an arrestee also cannot be
solely to “further the prosecution’s effort to obtain a conviction
against [the defendant].”125
Georgia’s statute allowing DNA collection from convicted felons
has already withstood multiple court challenges and may give insight
into how courts will evaluate an amended statute including
arrestees.126 The Georgia Supreme Court has upheld the statute based
on the rational intent of the legislature in protecting incarcerated
individuals and the public.127 While the court only upheld the statute
for collecting DNA from convicted felons, because of previous
treatment of arrestees, the rationale may extend to pre-trial detainees
as long as the legislature exhibits a rational reason for doing so.128
The Georgia Constitution is stricter than the Federal Constitution
regarding individual privacy,129 but the Georgia Supreme Court has
plainly stated that including explicit statements regarding legitimate
government interests in a statute can assist in outweighing an
individual’s privacy interests to find a warrantless search
reasonable. 130 Because Georgia pre-trial detainees do not have the
123. State v. Henderson, 517 S.E.2d 61, 63 (Ga. 1999) (adopting the application of the Supreme Court
case Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) that arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy due to
the duty prison officials have to safeguard the detention facility).
124. Id. at 64.
125. Id.
126. Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005); Quarterman v. State, 651 S.E.2d 32 (Ga.
2007); State v. Henderson, 517 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1999).
127. Quarterman, 651 S.E.2d at 34.
128. Id.; see also Henderson, 517 S.E.2d at 63 (stating that, although there is a distinction between a
“prisoner” and a pre-trial detainee, pre-trial detainees have a diminished expectation of privacy in their
cells than free citizens in the community).
129. Compare GA CONST. art. I, § 1, with U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
130. Donald, 401 F.3d at 1282 (quoting King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ga. 2000)) (“The state
may constitutionally intrude upon a protected privacy interest ‘pursuant to a statute which effectuates a
compelling state interest and which is narrowly tailored to promote only that interest.’ Law enforcement
constitutes a compelling state interest.”).
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same privacy interest in their physical property as free individuals131
and the state government has a legitimate interest in the collection of
arrestee DNA, 132 the legislature may summarize the government
interests in the statute to solidify their intent in passing the bill. In
doing so, the above stated interests may be properly and consistently
weighed against personal privacy interests at stake.
III. CHANGING GEORGIA’S LAW
The Supreme Court’s decision that Maryland’s arrestee DNA
collection act was constitutional should lead other state legislatures to
follow, but legislatures should also strive to make their own DNA
collection acts superior to other states’ statutes. 133 There is a
legitimate interest in having all states implement these collection
procedures to strengthen the national criminal justice system.134 The
Court focused on many factors,135 all of which should be included in
the Georgia statute to avoid any future misconceptions or its
unconstitutionality.136
The Georgia legislature should implement stricter regulations to
manage the procedures involved in maintaining the DNA database,
taking it away from the Georgia Bureau of Investigations so that they
may impose punishments for the use of “offline” databases and
131. Henderson, 517 S.E.2d at 62–63 (adopting the Hudson v. Palmer, 458 U.S. 517 (1984) holding
that arrested individuals have limited constitutional protections in comparison to those protections
enjoyed by free citizens).
132. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. (detailing how violence has risen in correctional facilities, the
technological advantages of building a larger DNA database, and how that would help the Georgia
Innocence Project accurately assist those who have been wrongly convicted).
133. See generally Sugzda, supra note 68. See also Marc Jonathan Blitz, Third Party Records
Protection on the Model of Heightened Scrutiny, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 747, 786 (discussing how the
American Bar Association’s new Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records
“provide some hints as to how lawmakers might [require procedural protections the Court has refused to
require] in the sections on de-identification, retention and maintenance, and disclosure and
dissemination”).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2012). The statute itself is entitled “Index to Facilitate Law Enforcement
Exchange of DNA Identification Information.” Id.
135. See generally Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
136. See discussion supra Part II.A. Even with the included factors, courts may still hold the statutes
unconstitutional under respective state constitutions, which are stricter than the U.S. Constitution, but
the Georgia legislature’s increasing protections on personal privacy may assist in avoiding a similar
ruling. See, e.g., State v. Medina, 102 A.3d 661 (Vt. 2014).
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comply with the federal requirements.137 The use of DNA technology
is widespread and unavoidable, so greater legislative regulation is
necessary: through the implementation of a commission, the
inclusion of the state’s interests in the statute, and the incorporation
of the specific factors discussed in Maryland v. King.138
A. Establishing A Commission
In order to promote the Maryland v. King factors 139 while
continually monitoring the changing science of DNA,140 states should
individually establish a commission to maintain the goals of the
Supreme Court’s opinion. 141 The commission should bear
responsibility for persistently examining the relevant laws and
technology, and for maintaining conformity in the event that science
exceeds the scope of the current law and infringes on personal
privacy rights of arrestees. 142 In order to facilitate technological
implementations, the FBI has already implemented a Rapid DNA
Program Office to facilitate and oversee the use of Rapid DNA
Testing devices in law enforcement. 143 Having a state-run
commission in addition to the federal organization will ensure that
the federal goals are properly applied to Georgia’s laws.

137. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-160(c) (2012); see 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b) (2006) (including extensive
requirements for states to continually partake in the federal DNA database program, states must regulate
the laboratories that maintain the databases and must only release DNA profile information under
certain circumstances); GA. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS – DIV. OF FORENSIC SCIS., supra note 12
(listing the DNA collection and analysis responsibilities of the Georgia Bureau of Investigations). For a
discussion of “offline” databases, see Joh, Policing and Genetic Privacy, supra note 5, at 286.
138. See generally Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013); see also David Alan Slansky, Too
Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV.
1069, 1074 (“[T]echnological and social developments have made or soon will make privacy
impossible, whether we like it or not.”).
139. See generally Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
140. See Joh, Policing and Genetic Privacy, supra note 5, at 292–93; see also Slansky, supra note
138.
141. See Joh, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 37, at 55 n.131 (suggesting establishment of “a
permanent commission to oversee [DNA databanks] . . . ”) (quoting Phil Reilly, Legal and Public Policy
Issues in DNA Forensics, 2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 313, 317 (2001)).
142. Id. See also Emma Raviv, Homing In: Technology’s Place in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence,
28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 593, 605 (2015) (explaining how difficult it is to create laws about technological
advancements due to the unpredictability of today’s ever-evolving technology).
143. See Rapid DNA or Rapid DNA Analysis, supra note 81.
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B. Specific Government Interests
The legitimate government interests should be included in the
Georgia statute so that if it is ever under attack, the presiding court
can properly balance the government interests with the privacy
interests of the individual. 144 Generally, DNA collection from
arrestees allows for increased accuracy in the criminal justice system
and ensures that justice is served on the correct individual.145 DNA
profile compilation from arrestees will also help keep correctional
officers safe while working inside correctional facilities.146 Knowing
the background of the offenders will assist in placing each arrestee in
the proper prison facility based on his potential for violent
behavior.147 While the generally applicable government interests are
important and highly relevant, the interests specific to Georgia should
also be included in the legislation.
Georgia prisons and jails have an exceedingly high rate of inmate
deaths.148 Prison procedures that classify offenders based on level of
violence should be implemented in local jails to reduce overall
correctional facility violence. 149 For law enforcement to determine
the proper classification for arrestee placement, it will be helpful for
them to have each arrestee’s DNA profile connected to previous
arrests and the related documentation of those arrests.150 Having an
accurate list of all previous violent crimes the arrestee committed or
for which he was arrested will enable law enforcement to classify
144. W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Requiring Submission to Physical Examination or Test as Violation of
Constitutional Rights, 25 A.L.R.2d 1407 (2015) (listing multiple situations where a state’s actions were
valid against personal privacy rights when the statute set forth legitimate government interests that
outweighed the individual rights).
145. See generally Garrett, supra note 117.
146. Cf. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1971 (2013) (“The interests are [different than interests
of searching a physical place] when an individual is formally processed into police custody.”).
147. Id.
148. Smith, supra note 114.
149. See generally GEORGIA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 115. See also Florence v. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (noting that individuals arrested for minor offenses may turn
out to be the most dangerous offenders and giving the example that Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma
City bomber, was stopped by a state trooper for not having a license plate just after the bombing).
150. Laboratory
Services:
CODIS—NDIS
Statistics,
FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited July 1, 2015)
(listing 295,049 offender profiles in the state of Georgia and 5,677 investigations aided through the use
of CODIS as of May 2015).
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arrestees according to their violent or non-violent propensities,
making the jails safer because violent individuals may be kept
separate from the general population.151
C. Maryland Factors Applied To Georgia
In drafting state law regarding DNA collection from arrestees, the
Georgia legislature should implement the best features of other
states’ laws.152 Georgia should expound on the minimum protections
discussed in Maryland v. King to better protect the privacy interests
of Georgia citizens.153
1. Identification Factors Only
DNA collection is necessary to determine the proper identification
of an individual but can reveal more personal information. 154
Therefore, law enforcement should be strictly limited to only
discovering the identifying factors of an individual through DNA
analysis.155 This limitation protects the medical and genetic privacy
of the arrestee, the absence of which would upset the balance of
reasonableness.156 Explicitly limiting DNA analysis to identification
will better protect individual privacy without inhibiting any
legitimate government interests.157
151. Matthew R. Durose et al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from
2005 to 2010, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, NCJ 244205, (Apr. 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
rprts05p0510.pdf (stating that 71.3% of the violent offenders tracked were rearrested for a new crime
within five years of release).
152. Stuart, supra note 36, at 1158–77 (including an appendix of the positive and negative aspects of
each state statute as of January 29, 2014).
153. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
154. But see Santos, supra note 35, at 596 (explaining that “a forensic DNA profile cannot reveal
information about your health status, your propensity to disease, or your physical appearance any more
than your Social Security Number can”).
155. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2011) (“Only DNA records that
directly relate to the identification of individuals shall be collected and stored.”); § 2-512(c) (“A person
may not willfully test a DNA sample for information that does not relate to the identification of
individuals as specified in this subtitle.”); King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967.
156. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979 (stating that processing an arrestee’s DNA based on the 13 CODIS loci
“did not intrude on [the arrestee’s] privacy in a way that would make his DNA identification
unconstitutional”).
157. Id. at 1979–80 (noting that when the duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures is included in the
statute or regulation, privacy concerns are inherently minimized).
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Georgia’s proposed arrestee DNA collection statute allows law
enforcement to collect an arrestee’s DNA “to determine identification
characteristics specific to the individual whose DNA sample is being
analyzed.”158 The wording of the statute lends itself to an inclusive
reason for collecting DNA, but should be amended to exclude all
other possible uses for the DNA sample. Georgia should also
expressly forbid law enforcement from engaging in familial
searches.159 Imposing limited uses makes the statute more restrictive,
and thus, more protective of the individual rights of arrestees.
The major flaw with DNA and its use for identification purposes is
speed.160 For the FBI to process a DNA sample, it takes at least thirty
days,161 but the process could be even longer in state laboratories.162
The disconnect between DNA collection and analysis will be
resolved with new technology—Rapid DNA testing—but the
technology may cause more of an intrusion into personal privacy by
providing law enforcement with an insight into an individual’s
genetic predispositions or medical history before probable cause is
confirmed.163 The creation of rapid DNA technology reinforces the
need to establish a commission to regulate DNA laws and science to
avoid both a reduction in governmental interests and an increased
level of intrusion into personal privacy rights.

158. S.B. 77, § 3, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (Senate Committee Substitute).
159. Jessica D. Gabel, Indecent Exposure: Genes Are More than a Brand Name Label in the DNA
Database Debate, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 561, 585 (2013) (stating that, if familial searches are allowed,
there should be specific provisions on methods for searching). Accord People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d
753, 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), petition for review granted, 342 P.3d 415 (Cal. 2015); Natalie Ram, DNA
by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873 (2015) (describing how the allowance of familial
searching does not recognize that an individual’s genetic information is involuntarily shared with family
members and since individuals have a cognizable interest in controlling identifiable genetic information,
familial searches should not be allowed).
160. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1983–86 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. See DNA Casework Unit (DCU) Case Acceptance, supra note 81.
162. State laboratories suffer, more often than the FBI lab, from financial setbacks and are more
susceptible to delay based on a lack of supply or personnel. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF
JUSTICE , AUDIT REPORT: THE COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM 51–54 (2001),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0126/final.pdf.
163. See Rapid DNA or Rapid DNA Analysis, supra note 81 (providing the details of technology that
would be able to read and analyze a DNA sample and create an individual profile with no human
intervention).
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2. Listing Specific Crimes
Maryland v. King also discusses the statute’s enumeration of
specific crimes for which arrestee DNA may be collected, and
multiple states have successfully implemented similar statutory
listings. 164 Georgia has proposed legislation that allows DNA
collection from “[a]ny individual arrested for a serious offense.”165
The bill also includes the definition of “serious offense” and lists
twenty-nine crimes that would qualify for DNA collection in addition
to crimes considered a “serious violent felony.”166 Instead, however,
the legislature should specify that only violent felonies warrant DNA
collection upon arrest to better promote the underlying intent of the
law: reducing the worst kind of crimes and protecting the public by
preventing those violent criminals from continuing to offend. 167
Including non-violent felonies does not serve legitimate government
interests and increases infringement on the rights of a larger number
of individuals, tipping the balance of reasonableness towards
unconstitutional.168
3. Automatic Deletion
Many states have DNA collection statutes that include provisions
to automatically delete offender profiles and physical samples if the
suspect is not convicted or the conviction is overturned. 169 This
provision best protects the personal privacy interests of the arrestee
and supports the idea that the DNA profile is only for identification
purposes during the term of incarceration. With evolving technology,
the possibility of creating an automated reporting system that ties the
original DNA collection data to the ultimate court disposition is
feasible and can be logistically solved and monitored by a
commission.
164. See Stuart, supra note 36, at 1159–77.
165. S.B. 77, § 2, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (Senate Committee Substitute).
166. Id. at § 1 (even listing drug offenses such as possession or use of marijuana).
167. Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law
Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127, 165 (2001).
168. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. See statutes cited supra note 60.
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Consistent DNA profile removal procedures are important
nationally, therefore the Georgia legislature should clarify the
applicable section in Georgia’s statute. Georgia’s proposed
legislation allows an individual to request removal of his or her DNA
profile if the arrest does not culminate in conviction. 170 The
legislation also lists the paperwork that will trigger “the bureau” to
purge the records, but does not make this process automatic as it
should be. 171 The bill places the burden on the arrestee to seek
expungement, instead of providing for automatic expungement,
increasing the privacy invasion on the arrestee and tipping the
balance towards unconstitutionality.172
4. Disposal of Physical DNA Samples
Advocates of personal privacy dislike the fact that many
jurisdictions not only have a “database” of DNA profiles, but also a
“data bank” of physical DNA samples. 173 To protect the personal
privacy of arrestees, the Georgia legislature should include a
provision in the code to demand disposal of the physical sample after
the DNA profile is entered into the database and after a certain
amount of time has passed.174
Georgia’s proposed legislation also confuses the definitions of
“database” and “data bank,” which should be clarified to prevent
confusion and potential infringement on personal privacy. 175 A
database is a collection of DNA profiles, but a data bank is a
collection of physical DNA samples. 176 Georgia’s proposed
170. S.B. 77, § 5, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (Senate Committee Substitute).
171. Id.
172. People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), petition for review granted, 342
P.3d 415 (2015).
173. Santos, supra note 35, at 605 n.117. “Strangely, our discomfort with the idea of someone looking
at a tiny portion of our overall genetic profile in a highly regulated and controlled setting is greater than
our trepidation about sharing personal information on Facebook or Twitter . . . .” Id. At 598; see also
Kaye, supra note 35, at 47 (supporting the idea that DNA sampling and profiling is not a bad thing as
long as the samples are not retained).
174. Gabel, supra note 159; see also Ferrell, supra note 36, at 257–58.
175. See generally Quarterman v. State, 651 S.E.2d 32, 33 n.1 (Ga. 2007); Ga. S.B. 77.
176. Roberto Iraola, DNA Dragnets – A Constitutional Catch?, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 15, 20 (2005)
(“Databanks store DNA samples consisting of blood, saliva, tissue or fluid. Databases, on the other
hand, consist of portions of those samples which have been analyzed. The analysis, which yields a
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legislation includes multiple references to a DNA data bank when
referring to DNA profiles, which should be amended for clarity.177
Because of the differences between Maryland’s and Georgia’s
arrestee DNA Collection Acts, Georgia’s Act likely will not pass
constitutional muster if challenged as it is currently written. Enacting
this type of statute will be beneficial to the state as a whole and will
positively impact crime victims and their families,178 but it should
only be enacted if it will not be overturned in the future. Therefore,
the Georgia legislature should incorporate the above changes before
passing the proposed legislation into law.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court determined that collecting DNA from arrestees
is constitutional if it conforms within certain restrictions to protect
personal privacy.179 In holding that law enforcement’s collecting and
analyzing arrestee DNA samples were constitutional actions, the
Court found that the legitimate government interests outweighed the
personal privacy interests of the individual, making the search
reasonable within the limits of the Fourth Amendment. 180 The
Supreme Court prioritized the specific factors of the Maryland DNA
Collection Act that the legislature implemented to safeguard
individual liberties, and as long as those rights are protected, the
statute is constitutional.181 Other state legislatures—which have not
already done so—should mirror the Maryland statute to solidify the
underlying policy interest of strengthening the national DNA
database and reducing the number of violent felonies.
genotype or ‘profile’ expressed as a set of numbers, is what is entered into state or local databases.”).
177. Ga. S.B. 77, at §§ 2, 5 (including incorrect phrases such as: “identification characteristics of the
profile resulting from the DNA analysis shall be stored . . . in a DNA data bank” and “an individual
whose DNA profile has been included in the data bank”).
178. Press Release, Ga. Bureau of Investigation, GBI’s DNA Database Has Over 3,500 Confirmed
Hits (Sept. 24, 2013), http://gbi.georgia.gov/press-releases/2013-09-24/gbi’s-dna-database-has-over3500-confirmed-hits (explaining that 409 cases have been solved through the addition of felony
probationers to the DNA database).
179. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
180. Id.
181. See generally King, 133 S. Ct. 1958.
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Since Georgia has a legitimate State interest in collecting DNA
from arrestees, the legislature should extend the current DNA
collection statute to include arrestee DNA profiles in State and
Federal DNA databases. In doing so, however, the legislature should
carefully craft the statute so that the legitimate interests of the
government outweigh the risks of infringing individual privacy
rights. Thus, ensuring that the statute is considered constitutional
under both the State and Federal Constitutions. The Georgia
legislature should enumerate specific state interests and the reasoning
for including each Maryland v. King factor to prevent any
misapplication of the legislature’s intent in the courts. 182 A
commission should be established to continually monitor the laws
and science of DNA collection, so as not to infringe on an arrestee’s
personal privacy rights in the future.183 These changes must be made
before the bill is passed in order to avoid its future abolition.

182. See supra Part III.B–C.
183. See supra Part III.A.
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